On August 2, 1971, U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers announced the official stand on the so-called question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. He said that: (1) The will favor seating of the Chinese Communist regime at the United Nations General Assembly this fall. Admission will be decided by a simple majority. (2) The will oppose any move to oust the Republic of China from the United Nations and believes that this is an important question which will require a two-thirds vote in the U.N. General Assembly. (3) 's seat in the U.N. Security Council is to be resolved by decision of U.N. members.
This announcement manifests a switch in the U.S. China policy of the past 20 years. U.S. Senator Peter Dominick, Colorado Republican, called the new policy a "tragic mistake." Chinese Ambassador to the United States James C. H. Shen described it as "a police department asking criminals to help them."
On Chinese Communist "army day" August 1, stressed the line "to remain loyal forever to proletarian internationalism and to cooperate and fight together to the very end with the proletarians and revolutionary peoples of the world." This is reiteration that Chinese Communist subversion, infiltration and communication of the free world are to be continued. This policy is diametrically contrary to the United Nations' purpose, as stated in the Charter, to maintain international peace and security.
On August 4, Peiping denounced Rogers' statement as "dished up against the background of the doomed utter failure of the U.S. policy of obstinately insisting on making itself the enemy of the Chinese people at the United Nations ... Faced with the predicament of being more isolated than ever, the U.S. government has to make some changes in its tactics ... This fully lays bare the counterrevolutionary, double-dealing tricks of U.S. imperialism which says one thing and does another." Describing the statement as bare-faced lying," NCNA reflected no change or improvement in Peiping's attitude toward the .
said, "As far as the Republic of China is concerned, we think that expulsion obviously is an important question. The Charter so provides ... " (See Article 6 of the U.N. Charter which reads: 'A member of the United Nations which has persistently violated the Principles contained in the present Charter may be expelled from the Organization by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.') "The Republic of China has played a loyal and conscientious role in the United Nations since the organization was founded. It has lived up to all of its Charter obligations. Having made remarkable progress in developing its own economy, it has cooperated internationally by providing valuable technical assistance to a number of less developed countries, particularly ."
The legal status of the Republic of China has not changed since the founding of the world body. Its government continues to function on Chinese territory on the and there has been no break in the continuity of its leadership. Thus a proposal for the expulsion of the Republic of , a founding member of the United Nations, is itself a violation of the United Nations Charter.
After Nixon announced his acceptance of 's invitation to visit the Chinese mainland, the U.S.S.R. reacted prudently. By stating that it was closely watching the con sequences of such a step, the Kremlin showed suspicion of the .
A book entitled Foreign Policies of the People's Republic of China, published recently in makes the following observation: "Peking leaders advocate 'people's war' to oppose imperialism. Now they claim they are preparing to coexist peacefully with imperialism if the can clear away the obstacles causing the discord between the two countries (withdrawal of troops from , recognition of the Chinese Communist regime, and lifting of trade restrictions)."
On July 17, Pravda and Izvestia published a short Tass dispatch on the Nixon announcement with no comment. On the following day, Komsomolskaya Pravda observed that the step was "unusual but not unexpected." On July 19, M.M. Volkov, Soviet ambassador to , told reporters that it would be a good thing for Nixon to visit the Chinese main land. The Literatumaya Gazeta of July 21 quoted a comment from the Bulgarian news agency BTA, saying that the sudden friendship between Peiping and after 20 years of hostility was rather unusual.
On July 21 Pravda published a letter from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to U Thant dated July 13:
"For the sake of assuring and pre serving peace, the believes that the capabilities of the United Nations should be fully utilized. The broad representation of the United Nations is crucial to the promotion of its function and dignity. Restoration of the legal rights of the People's Republic of in the United Nations and expulsion of the Chiang Kailshek elements from all the U.N. organizations will serve this end."
On July 25 Pravda published a commentary entitled, "On the Peking-Washington Dialogue" by I. Alexsandrov. It praised Nixon's announcement as "creating peace." However, "there is a big difference between the words and deeds of the ruling group." Alexsandrov said. At the 24th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, the Soviets made clear their policy toward the Chinese Communist regime and the . The CPUSSR advocates restoration of normal relations between Peiping and , promotion of a Washington Moscow relationship under the principle of mutual benefit to the peoples of the and the U.S.S.R., and world peace. The Soviets said: "Our party and our government will consider the possible consequences of the China-U.S. dialogue."
Only July 26, V. Zorin, a television commentator, said Nixon's decision to visit the Chinese mainland was more pragmatic than past policies. However, the has not yet recognized the Peiping regime and it is not likely that the president will achieve anything, he added. If the visit is aimed at opposing a third country, it will make the international situation worse.
To avoid facing enemies on two sides, the U.S.S.R. probably will make an increased effort to restore friendship with . Nixon's visit to the Chinese mainland, considered by some Western observers as a move to separate the two leading Communist regimes, could bring them closer together.
The Asian policy of' Peiping and Moscow is not only part and parcel of their struggle against each other but also aimed at diminishing American, Japanese and European influenees in the region. Most Asian countries tend to be cautious about both and . But the shift in American policy could alter their attitudes. Professor Rostow, national security adviser to the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, has warned the against abandoning .
will also try to fill the vacuum when American power is withdrawn from . It was in order to achieve this purpose that Brezhnev called for an Asian collective security pact in June of 1969. established embassies and trade missions in . and and offered aid to both and . Machinery will go to in exchange for rubber and coffee. Reactions of Asian countries have been cold and cautious.
In Latin American countries, both and are supporting anti-U.S. activities of the radical leftists. Russian influence seems to exceed that of . Red Chinese have done well in "third world" countries as a result of their propaganda against American and "social-imperialists" and also because of the inherent anti-Western and anti-superpower sentiment of some Asian, Latin American and African countries. 's propaganda machine has repeatedly denounced the superpowers' monopoly of world affairs and described the "Peiping-Moscow-Washington triangular relationship," as an attempt to "fish in troubled waters." The Chinese Commumists say they have drawn clear demarcation lines in their struggle vis-a-vis and and that the time has passed for the superpowers to impose their will upon the small nations. " wants the U.N. forum to expand this campaign.
The Russian journal New Times described the Mao regime as "a sheep in wolf's clothing" and its foreign policy as a menace to world peace. Pravda said any attempt to use ping-Washington rapprochement to exert pressure on the or any other socialist country would be futile.
Both Peiping and will still consider as their No. 1 enemy in strategy to promote Communism. finds nuclear war too high a price for world conquest. The Russians will increase their military striking power, solicit more partners by expanding foreign aid and diplomatic offensives, and last but not least, encourage revolution by covert and overt means.
The Chinese Communists lack the capability to challenge Russian and American military might and the resources to compete with the Russians and Americans in foreign aid. Thus Peiping's strategy is (1) to provoke conflict between the and the , (2) weaken opponents within their own territory, (3) encircle opponents from without and (4) use the strength of the opponents against each other.
Some observers claim Nixon's visit to mainland will reduce international tension and promote stability. This is a sentimental desire for change rather than a description of reality. The is still committed to defend its allies and democratic principles.
The Mao regime continues to stick to the dictatorship of the proletariat, to call for the power seizure through the barrel of a gun and to organize a worldwide anti-U.S. united front. The supposedly friendly relations between the Nixon Administration and the Mao regime reflect political expediency. Both parties hope to solve pressing problems at home and abroad.
and the Viet Cong are suspicious about Washington-Peiping rapprochement. They denounced deals between "big powers." This reveals their anti-Chinese Communist sentiment.
One of the purposes of Nixon's visit is to accelerate settlement of the Vietnam war by persuading Peiping to exert influence upon and the Viet Congo Nixon would derive great political advantage for the upcoming presidential election if he were successful. Judging from the reaction of and the Viet Cong, he is not going to succeed in his plan. -Chen Ying-che
Industry of Free - Water resources
A hydrologic network for was planned in 1966. The network consists of 456 rainfall stations. 136 stream gauging stations and 99 weather stations. All have the same observation and recording methods.
Rivers of Taiwan are short and steep. A few observation stations give limited information about the upstream watershed. From this information, it is difficult to forecast floods. It is possible to project a typhoon track a few days in advance but not yet possible to estimate accurately the amount of rainfall.
The Central Weather Bureau has a radar system for typhoon observation and tracking. A working group of CWB and the Provincial Water Conservancy Bureau are studying the rainfall-flood relationship of main river basins for forecasting.
Other projects include stream sediment surveys which have been made on water samples taken when discharge measurements were made. Silting of major reservoirs has been surveyed periodically.
Stream pollution is gradually becoming a serious problem, especially in the Hsintien Creek and near . Pollution by industrial wastes in the lower Hsintien Creek has been investigated.
Planning and development for multiple purpose utilization of water resources in was first carried out for the Shihmen Reservoir Project (1954). The concepts of comprehensive planning and interrelating development of upstream and down- stream projects in a river basin were first applied in the (1955-1957). An overall integrated approach to plan the entire water supply for meeting the total demands in a region was first adopted in the planning of Cho-Wu river basins (1957-1967).
During 1957-1958 an inventory of groundwater potential was completed with the cooperation of several related agencies. The Groundwater Development Bureau was set up to carry out survey, planning and development.
In 1964 the Taiwan Power Company completed a revised survey on potential hydro power sites. Hydro development was centered at Tachia Creek and Liwu Creek. The demand for peaking capability increased with the increase in size of base load plants. Hydro power was planned for development of peaking plants.
Most of the planning for irrigation development was to improve existing irrigation systems. The planning gave consideration to the soils and selection of crops. Starting from the Shihmen Reservoir Project, planning of all major irrigation projects included an economic survey on irrigated agriculture as a basis for estimation of farmers' repayment capacity.
Flood control projects in the early years consisted mostly of building dikes to protect agricultural land developments and rural settlements. Starting in 1960, flood control programs began to employ control measures other than diking.
By the end of 1968, all the rivers and catchment areas had undergone reconnaissance and preliminary studies. Important potentials of development were explored.
The "Criteria for Planning and Evaluation of Water Resources Projects" was issued by the Ministry of Economic Affairs in 1963 and was broadly adopted by planners.
Diking has been the principal means of flood protection. Revements and spur dikes have been built to make the main dikes safe. The construction, repair and periodic inspection of dikes and flood fighting operations for the 19 major rivers have been carried out by the PWCB. Such activities for smaller rivers were performed by the local hsien and township governments under the supervision and with the technical assistance of the PWCB.
Flood control by means other than diking has also been adopted. The Shihmen and A-Kung-tien reservoirs are operated for flood detention. Cutoffs, channel dredging and floodways have not yet been used effectively in . Non-engineering flood control measures included zoning of the flood plain of the and flood forecasting and warning. By 1968, nearly all the rivers on the western coastal plains were confined by dikes. Diking and channel land reclamation were being carried out for rivers in eastern .
A flood control fund was established in 1968. PWCB has been using the proceeds for compilation of information on the main rivers and for studies of plans for regulation.
The Taipei Water Works serves city and suburbs. In 1962 it had a daily capacity of 188,000 tons for a population of 850,000. By 1973, the population to be served will be 2 million and 443,400 tons of water will be required daily. Water is taken from Hsintien Creek and treated with rapid filtration and chlorination. The pressure of outflow is 40 pounds per square inch. The distribution network includes balancing reservoirs at Tachih and Wufenpu.
A supply system with daily capacity of 154,200 tons serves city, Fengshan and five counties. Estimated 1985 population to be served is 1,300,000 with daily capacity of 400,000 tons. The source is deep wells on the west bank of Kaoping Creek.
Shihmen Reservoir was planned to serve domestic and industrial users in 22 townships of the Taoyuan-Chungli area. The first stage included a central treatment plant at Pusin, raw water intake from the Huanting lateral of the Shihmen main canal and two main pipelines, one to Taoyuan, Chungli and Neili and the other to Yangmei, Pusin, Fukang, Hsinwu, Hukow, Laohukow, Shanchi and Hsinchuangtze. Daily supply is 30,000 tons, which can be increased to 69,000 tons. Raw water is treated through coagulation, sedimentation and rapid filtration. The treated water is stored in a highland tank.
Planning of the Shihmen Reservoir Project was carried out in 1954-1955. Preparatory construction was started in 1955. The main dam was built from 1959 to 1963. Initial storage was in 1963. The entire project took 11 years and full operation began in 1965.
The first inspection and cost accounting system in the water resources field was established in conjunction with this project. Cost was US$80 million for a project consisting of an embankment dam with an effective storage of 250 million cubic meters to regulate stream flow for multiple-purpose irrigation, public water supply, generation of electric power and flood control. The irrigation area totals 54,175 hectares, including Taoyuan, Kunagfu and other canals which take from Tahan Creek.
The Paiho Reservoir on Chi-shui Creek supplies domestie and industrial demands of Hsing-Ying, Yen-shui, Paiho and Tungshan townships, provides storage and control of small floods, and feeds irrigation water into Paishui Fengchihu, Tungshan and Touchien Creek cannals. The earthen dam is 42.5 meters high and provides 21.6 million cubic meters of storage. The project was started in 1962 and completed in 1965.
's hydro power potential is high. A Taiwan Power Company survey estimates that the potential totals about 3.5 million kilowatts. However, the cost for dams and storage is high and hydro power generation is limited by the dry season. Recent expansion of the power sys tem has emphasized thermal units. In 1953, hydro power represented about 85.8 per cent of capacity and about 93.7 per cent of generation. In 1968, hydro power accounted for only 37 per cent of system installation and 39.4 per cent of generation. Unit cost of hydro energy was still low compared with thermal. These are hydro plants:
Wu Lai is upstream on Hsintien Creek. It has a catchment area of 278 square kilometers. Construction was started in 1941 and completed in 1953. The project included modification of the downstream Hsinkuai-shan dam.
The Tungmen plant is located on the mainstream of the . The original plant was built in 1943. Floods of 1943 destroyed the diversion dam and intake and the power house was buried. Facilities were rebuilt and the powerhouse placed underground.
The Liwu plant diverts water from the Liwu Creek north of Hualien. Two units generating 32,000 kw were installed. The plant was built in 1944 but was damaged by flood. The diversion dam, intake, waterway and powerhouse were rebuilt.
The Tienlun plant takes water from the through a waterway eight kilometers long. Two generating units were installed in 1953. Crest gates over the diversion dam were added to raise the water level and the peaking capability was increased with a third unit.
The Wusheh plant is on the upper reaches of Chao-shui Creek. The storage dam is 114 meters high, of curved concrete gravity type. Storage capacity is 140 million cubic meters. Two crest gates have been installed atop the spillway and a separate spillway tunnel built for emergency use. The powerhouse is located downstream and includes two units with capacity of 20,700 kw. The storage of Wusheh Dam increases the flow of the downstream Choshui Creek and the generating capacity of the power plants.
A low dam was built on the Lung-feng Creek, a tributary of Mukua Creek, to divert water to the Lung chien plant through a 516-meter tunnel and 1,470-meter penstock leading to the turbine of the underground powerhouse.
The Shihmen plant is located downstream. Water is delivered through a short waterway. During the dry season, generation is for peaking.
The Kukuan plant is located above the diversion dam of the Tienlun plant. Construction of the project included an arch dam, a power intake and waterway, a surge tank and an underground powerhouse on the left bank of Tachia Creek. -Feng Chung-yue